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AN EXAMINATION OF THE LEGALITY
AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF RACE-CONSCIOUS
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The American judicial system has struggled with race-conscious af-
firmative action plans since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.' Unfortunately, the economic condition of blacks in this coun-
try2 shows that affirmative action is still necessary to remedy the effects
of past racial discrimination. This Recent Development examines the
history of affirmative action under both Title VII3 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.4 The article focuses on the
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (1982). The Act prohibits discrimination on the ba-
sis of race, religion, sex, or national origin in voting, public accommodations, public
schools, and employment. The purpose of the Act is "to protect and provide a more
effective means to enforce, the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 16, reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391.
2. On the average, blacks have a considerably lower standard of living than whites.
Between 1972 and 1984, the number of blacks below the poverty level was thirty per-
cent. NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA (1984). In con-
trast, only about thirteen percent of all whites live in poverty. Id. at 14. The average
unemployment rate for blacks was 14.5% in 1986. The rate for whites was 6%. Dept.
of Labor Statistics, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, April 1987, at 75.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, sex, or national origin in public or private employers' decisions on hiring,
promoting, and firing employees.
4. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applies to state action.
The text reads in pertinent part: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State
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three recent Supreme Court decisions regarding race-conscious affirma-
tive action plans: Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,' Local 28,
Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission,6 and Local Number 93, International Associ-
ation of Firefighters v. Cleveland.7 Next, the article suggests guidelines
to institutions and employers as to what constitutes a valid race-con-
scious affirmative action plan. The article concludes with a few words
on the appropriate standard of judicial review of affirmative action
plans.
II. HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII prohibits racial discrimination in employment.9 A key
purpose of Title VII is to protect the black person's right to equal em-
ployment opportunities.1° If an employer racially discriminates
wherein they reside. No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause of
the fifth amendment subjects the federal government to equal protection principles.
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
5. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
6. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
7. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
9. Title VII, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
10. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2393. The General Statement supporting H.R. 7152, which became the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, reads in part:
In various regions of the country there is discrimination against some minority
groups. Most glaring, however, is the discrimination against Negroes which exists
throughout our Nation. Today, more than 100 years after their formal emancipa-
tion, Negroes ... are by virtue of one or another type of discrimination not ac-
corded the rights, privileges, and opportunities which are considered to be, and
must be, the birthright of all citizens ....
... No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and conse-
quences of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities. There is
reason to believe, however, that national leadership provided by the enactment of
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against a person in the employment context, the victim of such dis-
crimination may sue the employer under Title VII. Title VII gives
courts the equitable power to order the appropriate relief.11 In individ-
ual cases of discrimination the appropriate relief is usually an order
requiring the employer to hire or reinstate the individual. When an
employer has discriminated against many people for a number of years,
however, individual relief may be an inadequate remedy. When appro-
priate, the statute empowers the court to order "affirmative action."12
Affirmative action means remedial preferential treatment on the basis
of race, often in the form of hiring goals. 3 The controversial legal
issue is determining when affirmative action constitutes appropriate re-
medial relief, and when it is illegal reverse discrimination.
Courts have extensively used their remedial powers under Title VII
to order affirmative action in cases of egregious employment discrimi-
Federal legislation dealing with the most troublesome problems will create an at-
mosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of discrimina-
tion.
It is, however, possible and necessary for the Congress to enact legislation which
prohibits and provides the means of terminating the most serious types of
discrimination.
Id. at 2393-94.
I1. Title VII, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intention-
ally engaging in an unlawful employment practice ... the court may enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such
affirmative relief as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees ... or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate .... No order of the court shall require the admission or rein-
statement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or
promotion of an individual as an employee.., if such individual was refused ad-
mission . . or discharged for any reason other than discrimination on account of
race....
Id.
12. Id.
13. One of the first references to racial quotas in affirmative action plans was in
President Johnson's Executive Order No. 11246, 30 F.R. 12319 (1965), codified in 3
C.F.R, 1964-5 comp., p. 139. The order required government contractors to take posi-
tive steps to hire and promote racial minorities and women. Id. The regulations pro-
vided that an acceptable affirmative action plan must include an analysis of areas in
which the contractor is deficient in the utilization of a minority group. 41 C.F.R. § 60-
2.1 1(b) (1986). If the contractor fails to employ a sufficient number of workers from a
particular minority group, the regulations require the contractor to set goals and timeta-
bles for the hiring of a certain amount of minorities. The contractor must use good faith
efforts to achieve these goals. The goals themselves must be flexible. 41 C.F.R. § 60-
2.12 (1986).
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nation. Several lower courts upheld numerical hiring goals as proper
remedial measures for past discrimination.14 These courts reasoned
that when an employer discriminates against blacks as a class, the only
effective relief is to provide a remedy to blacks as a class. Establishing
minimum hiring goals for blacks is one way of achieving this remedy.
Courts have construed Title VII as a limitation on the purposes for
which a court or an employer can use goals and quotas.15 In Rios v.
Enterprise Association of Steamfitters, Local 63816 four non-white
workers and the federal government sued the union to enjoin the prac-
tice of discrimination against minorities in the construction industry. 17
The plaintiffs urged the court to require the union to adopt an affirma-
14. See, eg., Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of
Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 281 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 998 (1982) (ap-
proved affirmative relief that offered 102 minority candidates firefighting positions
before white applicants); Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Constr. Co., 655 F.2d 146, 149 (8th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982) (construction firm's affirmative action plan
which expressed its minority hiring goals in terms of percentages of hours worked was
valid); Local 35, I.B.E.W. v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416, 417-18 (2d Cir. 1980)
(affirmative action plan providing for every good faith effort to achieve at least a 15%
level of female and minority employment held valid); United States v. City of Buffalo,
633 F.2d 643, 647 (2d Cir. 1980) (approves district court's setting of temporary hiring
goals for blacks at a percentage higher than their representation in city's total work
force or applicant pool); United States v. City of Chicago, 631 F.2d 469, 471 (7th Cir.
1980) (city permitted to strike a police sergeant's promotional roster without promoting
111 of 400 white officers); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 688
(6th Cir. 1979) (district court erred in disallowing an affirmative action plan which
involved a goal of 50% minority staffing at all levels of the police department); Davis v.
County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1343 (9th Cir. 1978), vacated as moot, 440 U.S.
625 (1979) (district court properly used quotas to eradicate effects of past discrimination
and such relief was not limited to identifiable persons denied employment in the past);
Patterson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 770 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976) (approved a settlement agreement establishing a mi-
nority hiring goal of 25%); United States v. Iron Workers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971) (approves court order obligating union to inden-
ture sufficient black applicants to overcome past discrimination); Contractors Ass'n of
E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854
(1971) (validates affirmative action plan promulgated under the authority of Executive
Order No. 11246).
15. Most courts prefer the term "goal" to "quota." "Quota" connotes something
rigid and permanent, whereas "goal" suggests something more flexible and temporary.
See Spiegelman, Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas after Stotts: A Narrative on the Role of
the Moralities of the Web and the Ladder in Employment Discrimination Doctrine, 20
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 340, n.1 (1985) (goals are merely flexible quotas, as both
involve allocating opportunities by group).
16. 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
17. Id. at 625.
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tive action plan which would ensure a certain number of black mem-
bers in the union by 1977.18 Arguing that such a plan would violate
Title VII,19 the union contended that section 7030) of the Act prohib-
ited all preferential treatment based on race." The Second Circuit
held that section 7030) prohibits a court from imposing racially prefer-
ential treatment adopted merely to attain and keep a racial balance in
an employer's workforce. 2 That section, however, does not prohibit
racially preferential treatment when a court or employer uses such
treatment to correct past discriminatory practice, as was true in Rios.2 2
In 1979 the Supreme Court decided in United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber 23 that voluntary affirmative action plans are not per
se violations of Title VII. Weber involved a collective bargaining
agreement between the union and Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical
Corporation. The agreement reserved 50% of the spaces in the plant's
craft training program for blacks. The parties intended the agreement
to be in effect only until the percentage of black workers in the plant
became commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor
force.2 4 In upholding the agreement, the Court held that a voluntary
affirmative action program does not violate Title VII if the program's
purpose is to eliminate racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job
25categories.
18. Id. at 626.
19. The particular provision in dispute was § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982),
which provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer
•.. to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the
race . . of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number of percentage of persons of any race... employed
by any employer.., in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons
of such race... in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available
work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
20. 501 F.2d at 628.
21. Id. at 631.
22. Id. at 630-3 1. See also United States v. I.B.E.W. Local 38, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970) (§ 7030) "... . cannot be construed as a ban
on affirmative relief against continuation of effects of past discrimination.... Any other
interpretation would allow complete nullification of the stated purposes of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964").
23. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
24. Id. at 197.
25. Id. This was Justice Brennan's test. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun sug-
gested that a voluntary affirmative action plan should be legal if the plan is an em-
ployer's reasonable response to "arguable violations" of Title VII. Id. at 211. Justice
1988]
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The Court in Weber articulated several criteria delineating when an
employer may use racial factors in an affirmative action plan. First, the
employer must design the plan so that it compensates blacks for past
discrimination. Second, the plan must avoid unduly interfering with
the interests of white workers. Finally, the plan must be a temporary
measure, terminating when the percentage of blacks in the union
equals the number of blacks in the labor force.26 Other courts added to
these restrictions by forbidding quotas where a viable, less restrictive
alternative exists.27
The first Weber criterion requires that the employer's affirmative ac-
tion plan be in response to evidence that the employer discriminated in
the past.28 Statistical evidence showing a disparity between the racial
composition of the employer's work force and that of the community
from which the employer hires is usually sufficient to support an em-
ployer's affirmative action plan.29 From such a disparity the court will
infer that, in the absence of discriminatory hiring practices, the work
Blackmun recognized the practical problem that employers have. A literal reading of
Title VII leaves employers facing liability, on the one hand for past discrimination
against blacks, while on the other hand risking liability to whites for preferential treat-
ment policies adopted to ameliorate the effects of prior discrimination against blacks.
Id. at 210. Allowing employers to institute affirmative action plans when they identify
an arguable violation of Title VII allows them to escape liability from this trap.
26. Id. at 208. The court held that the plan adopted in the collective bargaining
agreement "falls within the discretion left by Title VII to the private sector voluntarily
to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in
traditionally segregated job categories." Id.
27. Properly validated selection procedures, recruitment programs for minorities,
and records of the race of all applicants are examples of viable alternatives to quotas in
some instances. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 479 F.2d 960, 962-64 (5th Cir. 1973), cerl.
denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974).
28. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29. The EEOC interpretative guidelines to Title VII provide that a private em-
ployer's affirmative action plan shall contain three elements: 1) a reasonable self-analy-
sis, 2) a reasonable basis for concluding action is appropriate, and 3) reasonable action.
29 C.F.R. § 1608.4 (1986). If the self-analysis shows that in the past the employer
subjected blacks to disparate treatment, or the employer's policies had a disparate im-
pact on blacks, then racial goals and timetables for hiring and promotion may be appro-
priate. Id. The self-analysis need not establish that the employer violated Title VII
before the employer can institute an affirmative action plan. Id. See also Setser v.
Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981) (af-
firmative action plan valid response by an employer to a conspicuous racial imbalance in
his workforce); Local 35, I.B.E.W. v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416,422 (2d Cir. 1980)
(finding of discrimination within construction industry itself is sufficient to support an
affirmative action plan of any employer in the construction industry); Detroit Police
Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 688 (6th Cir. 1979) (statistics showing a gross
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force is representative of the racial composition of the population from
which the employer hires.3" Occasionally, however, a court will re-
quire a more particularized showing of past discrimination. 3 1 In a Ti-
tle VII case, courts rarely approve an affirmative action plan when the
employer's purpose is something other than the correction of past
discrimination. a2
An affirmative action plan will often favor a black worker or appli-
cant over a white counterpart. The Supreme Court stated an employer
must avoid unduly interfering with the interests of white workers in its
affirmative action plan.33 The Supreme Court recently addressed the
issue of the interests and expectations of white workers in Firefighters
Local Union Number 1784 v. Stotts.3 4 The Court in Stotts invalidated a
consent decree modification which prohibited the layoff of minority
firefighters in conformity with a bona fide seniority system.3 5 The
Court's decision reflects a trend in its recent holdings that affirmative
action plans which abrogate the seniority rights of white workers un-
duly interfere with their rights.3 6
Stotts was a black captain with the Memphis Fire Department. In
1977 Stotts filed a class action charging that the department had en-
gaged in a pattern of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII.3 7
The district court entered a consent decree settling the case.3 8 Both the
disparity between black employment in the Detroit Police Department and black repre-
sentation in the city's labor market held permissible to support a quota system).
30. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977).
31. See Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557, 562 (7th Cir.
1984) (city could not adopt an affirmative action plan merely based upon a finding that
a disparity existed between percentage of minorities in community and percentage of
minorities in the fire department).
32. But ef Detroit Police, 608 F.2d at 696 (justification that law enforcement will be
improved by a more integrated police force is sufficient to support this affirmative action
plan). This integration argument is usually found only in the context of school desegre-
gation. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
33. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
34. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
35. Id. at 2582.
36. Id. at 2586 (". . . it is inappropriate to deny an innocent employee the benefits of
his seniority in order to provide a remedy in a pattern-or-practice suit such as this.").
In Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986), the Court emphasized its
disapproval of race-based layoffs. The Court stated, "We have previously expressed
concern over the burden that a preferential layoff scheme imposes on innocent parties."
106 S Ct. at 1851 (citing Stotts).
37. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2581.
38 Id.
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department and the city denied any violation of law. The parties, how-
ever, agreed to attempt annually to fill 50% of the job vacancies in the
fire department with qualified black applicants.39 In addition, they
agreed to award approximately 20% of the promotions in each job
classification to blacks.' In 1981 the city announced its intention to
lay off workers, beginning with those with the least seniority, in ac-
cordance with the city's seniority system.41 The district court, how-
ever, enjoined the city from laying off any black firefighters.42 The
district court reasoned that layoffs would hurt blacks as a class more
than whites because blacks had less seniority than whites. The court
determined that the layoff plan would undermine the effectiveness of
the affirmative action plan.4 3 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.'
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court45 found that section 703(h)
of Title V1I 46 protected the seniority system that the district court at-
tempted to abrogate.47 The Court found that the seniority system was
bona fide because the city lacked discriminatory intent in adopting the
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2582.
43. Id.
44. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't., 679 F.2d 541, 566-57 (6th Cir. 1982). The Sixth
Circuit reasoned that the district court had the power to modify the consent decree
when circumstances changed. Id. at 546. A clause in the consent decree gave the trial
court the power to enter "such further order as may be necessary or appropriate to
effectuate the purpose of this decree." Id. at 567. The injunction was necessary because
layoffs would devastate minority employment in the fire department. Id. at 546.
45. The Court handed down four opinions in Stotts. Justice White delivered the
opinion of the Court. Justice O'Connor submitted a concurring opinion. Justice Ste-
vens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and
Marshall dissented. 104 S. Ct. 2576.
46. Title VII § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982) reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system.., provided that such differences are not the result of an
intention to discriminate because of race.
Title VII § 703(h). A "bona fide" seniority system is one that is facially neutral as to
race, fails to disguise discrimination, or discontinues the effects of past discrimination.
Bacia v. Bd. of Educ. of the School Bd. of the City of Erie, Pa., 451 F. Supp. 882 (D. Pa.
1978).
47. 104 S. Ct. at 2587.
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system.4" Therefore, in abrogating the seniority system to benefit black
employees,4 9 the district court abused its discretion by interfering with
the interests of white workers.5"
In summary, courts have interpreted Title VII as allowing racial
goals and quotas in affirmative action plans, subject to certain limita-
tions. If, however, a state is the employer, courts must consider the
equal protection clause in addition to the above analysis. The next sec-
tion discusses the history of affirmative action plans and the equal pro-
tection clause.
B. Equal Protection
The equal protection clause5" requires states to treat all similarly sit-
uated people similarly with respect to the purpose of the law. Affirma-
tive action plans pose constitutional problems because they treat people
differently on the basis of race. The Supreme Court first addressed the
validity of affirmative action plans under the equal protection clause in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 2 Bakke was a white
male who applied to the University of California-Davis Medical
School. 3 The school rejected him.54 Bakke sued the university, alleg-
ing that the medical school's affirmative action admissions program
discriminated against whites, and therefore violated equal protection.55
48. Id. But cf Recent Development, The False Alarm of Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 Y. Stotts, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 991 (1985). The Recent Development explains
that even though an employer lacked discriminatory intent in instituting a seniority
system, its seniority system may still radically undermine the effectiveness of an affirma-
tive action plan. Id. at 991. This is because black workers are typically among the most
recently hired, and so are also among the first fired under a seniority system. Id.
49. 104 S. Ct. at 2587.
50. Id. at 2586. See supra note 36. Justice White's majority opinion also contained
broad language suggesting that only "actual victims" of illegal discrimination are enti-
tled to relief. 104 S. Ct. at 2589. Taken literally, that statement suggests that racial
quotas are never appropriate. See e.g., Spiegelman, supra note 15, who explained that
Stotts called into question a judicial power to order quotas, since a quota by definition is
a remedy which goes to persons who are not actual victims. Spiegelman, supra note 15,
at 349. However, the Supreme Court recently retreated from this statement and eluci-
dated the legality of racial preferences in certain limited instances. See infra notes 137-
48 and accompanying text.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
53. Id. at 276.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 278.
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The medical school had two separate admissions programs. The
school's regular program had highly selective criteria.56 In the special
admissions program for minorities, the academic standards were lower
than those in the regular admissions program. The medical school re-
served sixteen out of the one hundred spaces in each class for students
from the special admissions program. 7 The medical school considered
Bakke's application for admission only under the regular program.58
The medical school admitted applicants under the special program
whose grade point averages and MCAT scores were significantly lower
than Bakke's.9
In Bakke a plurality of the Court60 declared that strict scrutiny 61
applied to all racial classifications, including the so-called "benign ' 62
classifications of affirmative action plans. Racial quotas are thus un-
constitutional according to the plurality, unless they are necessary to
accomplish a substantial state interest.63 Justice Powell believed that
the medical school lacked a substantial interest in remedying the effects
of past societal discrimination. The Court determined that the school
had a substantial interest in attaining a diverse student body. 64 Racial
quotas, however, were unnecessary and therefore an impermissible
means of accomplishing diversity within the student body.6 5 Thus, the
56. Id. at 273-74.
57. Id. at 274-75.
58. Id. at 276.
59. Id. at 277.
60. There were six separate opinions in Bakke. Justice Powell announced the
Court's judgment and filed an opinion expressing his views of the case. Justices Bren-
nan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part. Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun each filed a separate opin-
ion. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part.
438 U.S. 265.
61. Id. at 291.
62. Id. at 298. Justice Powell expressed doubt as to whether any racial group classi-
fications are truly benign. He noted that preferential programs may reinforce negative
stereotypes about the minority group. He also noted that innocent persons might have
to bear the costs of correcting problems which were not of their own making. Id.
63. Id. at 305. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6
(1978).
64. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-11. If, however, there were judicial, legislative, or ad-
ministrative findings that the medical school itself discriminated against blacks in the
past, then the school's interest in preferring members of the injured group would have
been substantial. Id. at 307.
65. Id. at 315.
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medical school's special admissions program was unconstitutional.66
The Court ordered the medical school to admit Bakke.6 7 Significantly
though, Justice Powell said the medical school could consider race as
one factor in the selection process, as long as it was not the sole fac-
tor." The holding is important because it allows state supported insti-
tutions to employ color-conscious affirmative action plans. 6
9
In a separate opinion, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Black-
mun declared that the scrutiny of benign racial classifications should be
less strict than the scrutiny of other such classifications because benign
classifications fail to discriminate against a disadvantaged minority.
These Justices suggested an intermediate level of scrutiny,7° under
which the racial classification must be substantially related to an im-
portant state interest.7" The Justices opined that compensating minori-
ties for past societal discrimination was an important state interest,
72
and the use of racial classifications was substantially related to that
objective.73
The Court's disagreement regarding the appropriate standard for
judging affirmative action plans continued in Fullilove v. Klutznick.74
Fullilove concerned the constitutionality of a congressionally designed
affirmative action plan.75 The Court 7 6 approved a government con-
66. Id. at 271.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 320. Justice Powell cited the Harvard Admission Plan with approval.
This plan allows an applicant to receive a "plus" for his racial or ethnic background,
while not explicitly placing minority applicants in a separate group and judging them on
different criteria than those used in judging non-minority applicants. Id. at 316-18, 321-
24,
69. Id. at 320.
70. Id. at 359.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 362.
73 Id. at 377. Justices Marshall, Brennan, White, and Blackmun also indicated
that a racial classification which stigmatizes any group or that singles out those dispro-
portionately represented in the political process to bear the brunt of the affirmative
action program violates equal protection. Id. at 361.
74. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
75. Id. at 453.
76. The Court delivered five opinions in Fullilove. Chief Justice Burger announced
the judgment of the Court. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion. Justice Marshall
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Stewart and Stevens both filed
dissents.
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struction contract program which contained set-aside provisions.
77
These set-aside provisions delineated explicit racial guidelines designed
to assist minority-owned businesses.78 Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the majority, found that Congress had narrowly drawn the pro-
gram's guidelines to accomplish the legitimate objective of remedying
the present effects of past discrimination. 9 Although Burger refused
to adopt either the strict or intermediate scrutiny level employed in
Bakke, he stated that the plan would survive judicial scrutiny under
either test.8 ° Instead, the Court held that Congress' findings of past
discrimination in the construction industry were sufficient to support a
race-conscious affirmative action program."1 Justice Burger held that
some harm to whites, incidental to the affirmative action plan, is
permissible.8 2
Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court lower federal
courts have been reluctant to invalidate affirmative action plans on
equal protection grounds.8 3 Most courts require that the government
agency make competent findings of its own, regarding past discrimina-
tion, before implementing an affirmative action plan.8 4 Lower courts
77. Id. at 484.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 481.
80. Id. at 492.
81. Id. at 506. (Powell, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 484.
83. See, e.g., South Florida Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of America,
Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846, 847 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
871 (1984) (ordinance granting set-asides to blacks in the contract bidding process was
constitutional); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 882, 897-98 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984) (promotional goal calling for an end goal of an equal
staffing ratio between blacks and whites in various positions of the police department
was constitutional as long as the blacks promoted were qualified for the positions in
which they were placed); Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 510 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1124 (1980) (state university's quota of hiring 25% black faculty members
between 1976 and 1979 to achieve a total percentage of black faculty members of 5% by
1979 was constitutional). But see Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 750 F.2d
557, 564 (7th Cir. 1984) (statistical data alone fails to constitute a finding of past dis-
crimination, and is constitutionally insufficient to justify a remedial plan that discrimi-
nates against white males); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 757, 763 (6th
Cir. 1983) (district court's imposition of a 20% quota system for the teaching staff was
unconstitutional because the school district had made a sustained good faith effort to
recruit minority faculty members).
84. See South Florida Contractors, 723 F.2d at 852 (county commission was compe-
tent to make findings of past discrimination); Bratton, 704 F.2d at 888 (board of police
commissioners was competent to make findings regarding the existence and effect of
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have applied the full spectrum of scrutiny levels in analyzing racial
quotas under the equal protection clause. Some have used Burger's
analysis in Fullilove.8" Other courts have used strict scrutiny, 86 inter-
mediate scrutiny," and even the mere reasonableness test.88
The Supreme Court again addressed the issue of the use of racial
quotas in affirmative action plans. The trilogy of Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education,89 Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers International As-
sociation v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,9 0 and Local
Number 93, International Association of Firefighters v. Cleveland91 pro-
vides some guidance on both Title VII and equal protection challenges
to affirmative action. These three cases, however, do little to simplify
the inquiry as to whether a particular affirmative action plan is legal.
III. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
In Wygant a group of white teachers challenged a provision of the
collective agreement between the teachers' union and the school
prior discrimination on the part of the police department); Valentine, 654 F.2d at 508-
09 (HEW and District Court for D.C. were competent to make findings of past discrim-
ination on the part of Arkansas universities sufficient to justify affirmative action plan).
But cf Caulfield v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 632 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1980)
(a teacher transfer scheme to integrate faculty failed to require findings of past inten-
tional discrimination because the white teachers were not being seriously harmed).
85. South Florida Contractors, 723 F.2d at 856. The Eleventh Circuit held that the
state's affirmative action ordinance incorporated sufficient procedural safeguards to en-
sure that it was narrowly drawn to accomplish the legitimate objective of redressing
past discrimination. Id.
86. See, e.g., Oliver, 706 F.2d at 764, in which the Sixth Circuit found that a nullifi-
cation of seniority rights must be necessary before a court will find it constitutional.
87. See, e.g., Valentine, 654 F.2d at 510. The Valentine decision set forth helpful
criteria for determining when an affirmative action program is constitutional. Although
the Eighth Circuit used the intermediate scrutiny test, the criteria the court employed
are useful in analyzing an affirmative action plan under any test. First, the government
agency must design the plan to result in the hiring of a sufficient number of minority
applicants so that the racial balance of the agency's work force approximates the bal-
ance that the agency would achieve absent past discrimination. Id. Second, the plan
may last only as long as reasonably necessary to achieve its legitimate goals. Id. Third,
it is impermissible for the plan to result in the hiring of unqualified applicants. Id.
Fourth, it is impermissible for the plan to completely bar whites from all vacancies. Id.
88. See, e.g., Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 890 (6th Cir. 1983).
89. 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
90. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
91. 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
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board.92 The provision would modify the existing seniority system in
the event of layoffs.9" Under the provision, the percentage of black
teachers laid off could not be greater than the percentage of black
teachers employed at the time of the layoff.94 Pursuant to the plan, the
school board laid off the plaintiffs, who were white teachers with
greater seniority95 than the black teachers the school board retained.96
The plaintiffs charged violations of the equal protection clause.97 The
district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, 98 and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed.99 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.' 0
The Court criticized both the justification for the layoff plan and the
nature of the plan itself.
The school board justified the plan as a means of providing minority
role models for minority students in an effort to mitigate the effects of
past societal discrimination.10 1 Justice Powell, in his plurality opin-
ion,1 o2 attacked the plan on a number of grounds. First, Justice Powell
stated that past societal discrimination is an insufficient basis for the
92. 106 S. Ct. at 1846.
93. Id. at 1845.
94. Article XII of the collective bargaining agreement stated:
In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers through
layoff from employment... teachers with the most seniority in the district shall be
retained, except that at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority per-
sonnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel employed at the
time of the layoff.... Each teacher so affected will be called back in reverse order
for positions for which he is certified maintaining the above minority balance.
Id.
95. By the time of the appeal to the Sixth Circuit, economic conditions had im-
proved so that only one white teacher was still laid off pursuant to the plan. Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1154 (6th Cir. 1984).
96. 106 S. Ct. at 1845-46.
97. Id. at 1846. They also alleged violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
98. Id.
99. Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1156-57. The constitutional test used was whether the
racially preferential layoff plan was substantially related to the school board's objectives
of remedying past discrimination and correcting the chronic and substantial under-rep-
resentation of minorities. The Sixth Circuit found that the plan passed this test. Id. at
1157.
100. 106 S. Ct. at 1846.
101. Id. at 1847.
102. The Justices filed five opinions in Wygant. Justice Powell wrote the plurality
opinion. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Marshall
and Stevens filed dissenting opinions.
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use of a remedial classification." 3 The school board fatally erred by
failing to prove its prior discrimination against blacks. ' 0 4 By present-
ing the statistical disparity between the number of black teachers in the
school system and the available black labor pool in the area, the board
could have shown past discrimination on its part.10 5 According to
Powell, but for past discrimination, the percentage of black teachers
would approximate the percentage of blacks in the relevant labor
pool.10 6 However, rather than demonstrating the disparity between the
percentage of minorities on the faculty and the percentage in the Jack-
son labor pool, the board correlated the number of black teachers with
the number of black students in the Jackson school system.10 7 Powell
noted that this correlation proved nothing about whether the school
board discriminated against black teachers in the past.108 Sharply crit-
icizing the role-model theory, Justice Powell stated that the idea that
black students are better off with black teachers suspiciously paralleled
the reasoning which fostered the segregated schools that Brown v.
Board of Education109 abolished. "O
In addition to disagreeing with the role-model theory, the major-
ity"' objected to the board's use of racial preferences as a basis for
layoff decisions.' 12 Although affirmative action plans may legally im-
pose some burdens on whites, Powell stated that layoffs unduly injure
innocent white workers. The Court implied that race-based layoffs are
more objectionable than racial preferences in hiring." 3 Powell distin-
guished between layoffs and hiring goals, noting that hiring goals im-
pose a diffuse burden on a large group of whites, while layoffs "impose
the entire burden of achieving racial equality" on a few individuals." 4
103. Id. at 1847. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
104. Id. at 1848. See infra note 119 and accompanying text for the dissent's expla-
nation of why the board did not present findings of past discrimination.
105. Id. at 1847. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. See also Hazelwood
School District, 433 U.S. at 308.
106. 106 S. Ct. at 1847.
107. Id.
108 Id. at 1847-48.
109. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110, 106 S. Ct. at 1848.
111. Justices Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and White.
112. 106 S. Ct. at 1849. See generally Fallon and Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Con-
flicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 S. CT. REV. 1.
113. 106 S. Ct. at 1851.
114. Id.
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Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun dissented. Marshall ar-
gued that the Court should have remanded the case to the district
court for further development of the record." 5 Because the district
court granted summary judgment to the board, the board lacked the
opportunity to fully present its evidence of prior discrimination." 6
Nevertheless, Justice Marshall addressed the merits of the case. The
dissent argued that Justice Powell's distinction between affirmative ac-
tion plans involving hirings and those involving layoffs was untena-
ble. 7 He explained that a preferential layoff system may be necessary
to protect a valid affirmative action hiring policy."' This is because
minorities are usually the "last-hired and first-fired" under a strict sen-
iority system.' 9
B. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
The Sheet Metal Workers case involved a long history of discrimina-
tion against blacks on the part of the union.1 20 In 1975 the district
court found the Sheet Metal Workers Union guilty of engaging in a
pattern of discrimination against blacks in violation of Title VII. 12'
The district court enjoined the union from future discrimination 2 2 and
ordered it to achieve a 29% non-white membership goal by July 1,
198 1.123 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.' 24
For failing to comply with the court-ordered plan 125 in 1982126 and
1983, the district court fined the union 127 and modified the affirmative
115. Id. at 1858 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1864.
118. Id. See supra note 45.
119. Id. Justice Marshall also found it important that the teacher's union to which
the plaintiffs belonged had agreed to the plan. Id. at 1866.
120. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l. Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3025
(1986).
121. Id. at 3024.
122. Id. at 3027.
123. Id. The court based the goal on the percentage of non-whites in the relevant
labor pool in New York City. Id.
124. Id. at 3028. On remand, the district court gave the union an additional year to
meet the membership goal. Id.
125. Id. at 3029.
126. Id. at 3028-29.
127. Id. at 3029. The court ordered the union to place the 1982 fine of $150,000 in
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action plan by establishing a 29.23% minority membership goal for the
union to reach by August 31, 1987.128 The Second Circuit affirmed the
membership goal. 129
In upholding the Second Circuit's decision, 130 the central issue1
3 1
the Court considered was whether section 706(g) of Title VII 13 2 pro-
hibits racial preference in court-ordered affirmative action plans.
133
The last sentence of section 706(g) prohibits a court from ordering a
union to admit an individual whom the union "refused admission...
for any reason other than discrimination."' 1 34 In announcing the judg-
ment of the Court,'3 5 Justice Brennan relied on the legislative history
of Title VII to uphold the court-ordered plan.
136
The union argued that section 706(g) authorizes a court to award
preferential relief only to the victims of actual discrimination.1 37 Jus-
tice Brennan disagreed, looking first at the plain language of the sec-
tion. 138  He stated that the section applies only in the situation in
which an employer demonstrates that, even absent any discrimination,
he would not have hired the worker who now alleges discrimination.' 39
Under this interpretation, section 706(g) clearly fails to require the
court to order relief only for the actual victims of past discrimination.
a fund designed to increase black membership in the apprenticeship program in the
union. Id. The 1983 fine was to pay for an "Employment, Training, and Recruitment
Fund." Id. at 3030.
128. Id.
129. Id. See also EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172,
1186 (2d Cir. 1985). The dissent in the Second Circuit argued that the district court's
attempts to force the union to comply with the 29.23% membership goal turned the
goal into a strict racial quota in contravention of Stotts and Bakke. 753 F.2d at 1194.
130. 106 S. Ct. at 3031.
131. There was also an equal protection claim. See infra notes 154-55 and accom-
panying text.
132. See supra note 11 for the full language of § 706(g).
133. 106 S. Ct. at 3034-35.
134. Title VII § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
135. There were five written opinions in Sheet Metal Workers. Justice Brennan an-
nounced the judgment of the Court and filed an opinion in which different Justices
joined different parts. Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Jus-
tice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justices White
and Rehnquist dissented.
136. 106 S. Ct. at 3034.
137. Id. at 3031.
138. Id. at 3035.
139. Id.
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In the instant case, Justice Brennan noted that under the membership
goal, the union could refuse to admit individuals to whom it previously
denied admission for reasons unrelated to discrimination. 140 There-
fore, the plain language of section 706(g) allowed the court-ordered
membership goal.14 1
Justice Brennan next turned to the legislative history of Title VII
and found that race-conscious affirmative action furthers the purposes
of Title VII.' 42 The purposes he referred to were those of eradicating
discrimination and creating employment opportunities for blacks.143
To achieve these purposes in cases so severe that an injunction prohib-
iting future discrimination is an insufficient solution,' 44 Brennan de-
clared that hiring and membership goals may be necessary.
According to Justice Brennan, Congress added section 706(g) to Ti-
tle VII to elucidate that a court is powerless to order a union or em-
ployer to adopt quotas merely to correct racial imbalances in his work
force when the imbalances were not due to the employer's racial dis-
crimination.' 45 In its debates over the section, Congress failed to dis-
cuss whether courts could prescribe racial preferences as a remedy for
past discrimination.' 46
Brennan also examined the legislative history of the Equal Employ-
ment Act of 1972, which amended Title VII.147 Congress failed to
amend section 706(g), implying congressional approval of the courts'
use of race-conscious affirmative action.148 Brennan then examined the
particular facts of the case and found that the district court's pre-
scribed remedies were appropriate because of the union's previous egre-
gious discrimination. 49 He followed the Weber analysis,50 noting
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 3036. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
144. 106 S. Ct. at 3036.
145. Id. at 3040. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. See also 110 CONG.
REc. 2558 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Goodell) ("There is nothing here as a matter of
legislative history that would require racial balancing").
146. 106 S. Ct. at 3040.
147. Id. at 3045.
148. Id. at 3047. For two examples of pre-1972 cases that applied race-conscious
relief under Title VII, see Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d
159, 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) and United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
149. 106 S. Ct. at 3050.
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that the membership goal was flexible,1 5' temporary, 1 52 and did not
unduly burden white workers, as no white workers would be laid off
because of the goal."5 3
The union also challenged the district court's orders under the equal
protection component of the fifth amendment due process clause.' 54
Justice Brennan declined to specify which level of scrutiny a court
should use in considering the constitutionality of affirmative action
plans, because the relief in this case passed even the strict scrutiny
test.155
C. Local Number 93, International Association
of Firefighters v. Cleveland
In Firefighters v. Cleveland, the companion case to Sheet Metal
Workers, the Supreme Court again construed section 706(g).1 56 White
firefighters challenged the district court's consent decree which con-
tained a race-conscious plan to increase the number of minorities in the
Cleveland Fire Department. 157 The plan called for the promotion of
firefighters on a one white to one black basis.158 The Sixth Circuit
found that the district court acted within its discretion in approving the
consent decree. 159
The Supreme Court affirmed.' 6 The precise issue the Court ad-
150. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
151. 106 S. Ct. at 3051. Justices White and O'Connor dissented on this point. They
each maintained that the contempt judgments against the union and the district court's
unwillingness to take economic decline into account, showed that the court was really
administering a rigid quota and not a flexible goal. Id. at 3062 (White, J., dissenting)
and at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152. Id. at 3056.
153. Id. at 3056-57.
154. Id. at 3052.
155. Id. at 3054.
156. Local Number 93, Int'l. Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063,
3071 (1986).
157. Id. at 3070. The district court adopted the consent decree on January 31,
1983, pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE § 4117.01-.23. Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of
Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 483, 492 (6th Cir. 1985).
158. 106 S. Ct. at 3069. In other words, when an employer promoted a white, it
had to promote a black as well. This goal was modified for the upper-level positions
because there were not enough qualified minority candidates. Id.
159. Vanguards of Cleveland, 753 F.2d at 485.
160. 106 S. Ct. at 3072.
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dressed was whether section 706(g) prohibits the entry of a consent
decree which gives relief to persons other than the actual victims of the
defendant's discriminatory practices. 161 The Court concluded that sec-
tion 706(g) allows such consent decrees.1 62
In Firefighters v. Cleveland Justice Brennan, writing for the major-
ity,161 ignored the question of whether section 706(g) always precludes
court-ordered relief to persons other than actual victims, as he already
discussed that issue in Sheet Metal Workers.'" Instead, the majority
opinion considered whether a consent decree is a court order for pur-
poses of section 706(g). 16' The Court concluded that a consent decree
is not a court order.166 Therefore, consent decrees could benefit per-
sons who were not actual victims of the defendant's discriminatory
practices even in situations where a court order would be unable to
benefit such persons.1 67
The Court reached its decision by noting first that Congress pre-
ferred voluntary compliance with Title VII, as opposed to litigation
and the resulting court orders.1 68 The Court then stated that Weber
elucidated that employers seeking to remedy racial discrimination
could voluntarily establish affirmative action plans that include reason-
able race-conscious relief that benefits persons who are not the actual
victims of discrimination. 169 Since an employer can do this volunta-
rily, the question for the Court became whether a consent decree was a
voluntary action.1 70
The Court reasoned that a consent decree resembles voluntary ac-
tion more than it resembles a court order. The Court examined the
legislative history of Title VII1 7 and found congressional concern over
161. Id. at 3071-72.
162. Id. at 3072.
163. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor joined Justice
Brennan in the majority opinion. Justice O'Connor also filed a concurrence. Justices
White and Rehnquist each dissented.
164. See supra notes 132-48 and accompanying text.
165. 106 S. Ct. at 3072.
166. Id. at 3075.
167. Id. at 3078.
168. Id. at 3072. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18
(1975).
169. 106 S. Ct. at 3072.
170. Id. at 3074.
171. Id.
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section 706(g) regarding the coercive aspects of a court-ordered affirm-
ative action plan. Congress wanted to avoid empowering the courts to
dictate to employers who the employers could hire.'7 2 According to
the majority, this type of coercion is not present in consent decrees.
Although technically a court judgment, 173 a consent decree's most fun-
damental characteristic is its voluntary nature.'74 Therefore, consent
decrees fail to implicate the congressional concerns over section
706(g).175
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Suggestions for Institutions Developing Affirmative Action Plans
The recent Supreme Court decisions fail to provide an easy blueprint
for constructing legal and constitutional affirmative action plans.
These cases do, however, provide some guidance to a governmental
body or an employer developing such a plan. The cases illustrate that
an institution must allege the proper reasons for the affirmative action
plan and devise the plan effectively to achieve the desired equal em-
ployment goals.
First, it is clear from Stotts and ygant that race-based layoffs are
impermissible because they excessively burden white workers. 176 It is
unclear, however, whether other race-conscious measures unduly bur-
den whites. Hiring goals are permissible, at least where they are in
response to past egregious discrimination. 177 Promotion goals fall be-
tween layoffs and hiring goals in terms of their burden on white work-
172. Id. at 3075. See, eg., 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey) (§ 706(g) elucidates "that employers may hire and fire, promote and refuse
to promote for any reason, good or bad," except when their choices violate substantive
sections of Title VII).
173. 106 S. Ct. at 3074.
174. Id. at 3075.
175. Id. at 3076. The Court noted, however, that the union might still have an
equal protection claim against the city, but the union failed to bring such a claim in the
present lawsuit. Id. at 3080.
The Court recently decided in United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987), that
a one black for one white promotion scheme is not unduly burdensome so long as the
scheme is temporary, flexible, and narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate state interest.
Id. at 1073-74. See generally Comment, Equal Protection and Affirmative Action in Job
Promotion: A Prospective Analysis of United States v. Paradise, 17 CuM. L. REV. 205
(1986-87).
176. See supra notes 50 and 112-14 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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ers.' 78 In Firefighters v. Cleveland the Court approved a consent
decree involving race-based promotions, but failed to say whether
white workers could later challenge such a plan under equal protec-
tion. 179 A good question for an institution to ask is whether its affirma-
tive action plan will harm identifiable individuals. If it does so, then
there is both a constitutional and a fairness problem.
An institution must admit that it discriminated against blacks in the
past in order to adopt an affirmative action plan. Although there may
be other valid reasons for affirmative action,18 courts most readily ac-
cept the remedying of past discrimination as a reason for the plan.
This reason, however, is an insufficient rational for adoption of such a
plan. 181
Further, the institution must support its admission of past discrimi-
nation with factual findings.' 82 It is unclear exactly what these find-
ings must include. The Supreme Court stated, however, that the
institution does not have the burden of convincing a court of its liabil-
178. See Fallon and Weiler, supra note 112, at 67.
179. 106 S. Ct. at 3080. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in United States v.
Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987). In Paradise, white troopers challenged a modification
of a consent decree fashioned by the district court for the Alabama Department of
Safety. Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1516 (1 1th Cir. 1985). The consent decree
required the department to promote one black trooper for each white trooper if there
was a qualified black trooper. This was to continue until either 1) black troopers com-
posed 25% of that rank or 2) the department developed a comparable plan. Id. at 1524.
The white troopers charged that the plan violated equal protection and Title VII. Id. at
1527, 1530. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's promotion plan. Id. at
1516. The Supreme Court affirmed. 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987). See supra note 175.
180. For example, a medical school may consider race for the purpose of achieving
academic diversity. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978).
181. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1847 (1986).
182. See Comment, Principles of Competence: The Ability of Public Institutions to
Adopt Remedial Affirmative Action Plans, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 581 (1986). The Com-
ment uses the concept of "institutional competence" to determine if a public institution
can implement an affirmative action plan. Id. at 582. There are two aspects of institu-
tional competence: 1) authority and 2) adequacy of the factual findings. Id Under the
authority aspect, the question is whether the institution has been given the power to
announce the government's interest in eradication of discrimination. Id. at 599.
Courts, through their article III power, and Congress, through § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, have the greatest authority in this area. Id. at 600.
The findings of fact requirement examines an institution's ability to determine if it
discriminated. An institution's determination is reliable if its fact-finding abilities are
comparable to, or improve on those of the courts. Congressional fact-finding is an ex-
ample of an improvement on the courts because Congress can conduct a broader in-
quiry than the courts can. Id. at 602.
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ity for past discrimination."8 3 The employer or institution need only
show that it had a firm basis for determining that affirmative action
was warranted.1
84
After Sheet Metal Workers, courts will uphold an employer's plan
which uses specific numbers or quotas.'8 5 Numbers are quite useful in
determining whether an affirmative action plan is effective. The goal of
the plan, however, must be flexible. If a change in circumstances ren-
ders the goal impractical, then the employer must revise the goal.'
86
A final point for institutions and employers to keep in mind is that
they should use other methods of increasing their black employment
rate before resorting to race-conscious goals. Examples include inten-
sive minority recruiting, maintaining records and reports on the race of
all their workers, and using tests that are non-discriminatory and prop-
erly validated.' 8 7 These methods can increase employment opportuni-
ties for blacks without unduly burdening whites. Institutions should
only take race-conscious action if the above mentioned methods inade-
quately remedy the effects of prior discrimination by the employer.
B. A Suggested Analysis for Courts
To date, the Supreme Court has failed to articulate a constitutional
standard for review of benign racial classifications. The Court appears
to be leaning towards a strict scrutiny approach. A plurality of the
Court 188 in Wygant purports to adopt the classic strict scrutiny test:
the racial classification must serve a compelling state interest and the
means chosen to effectuate this interest must be narrowly tailored to
the achievement of that goal.' 89 This is a very restrictive test, charac-
183. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184. Id.
185. Sheet Metal Workers involved a 29.23% membership goal. 106 S. Ct. 3019,
3030 (1986).
186. Id. at 3051.
187. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The EEOC's Uniform Guidelines
explain how an employment screening test can be validated properly. Psychologists
developed the Guidelines, intending to show employers how to use tests so that they do
not discriminate against blacks explicitly or implicitly. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1986).
188. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor comprised
the plurality. However, the retirements of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell may
well change the ideological viewpoint of the Court and thus shift its direction in affirma-
tive action cases.
189. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846.
19881
Washington University Open Scholarship
338 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 33:315
terized as "strict in theory and fatal in fact."19 The Court has never-
theless approved several race-conscious affirmative action plans. The
Court has had some trouble fitting these cases into the traditional strict
scrutiny test. This author suggests that the intermediate scrutiny test is
more appropriate.
In the years since Bakke, Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall
have argued strenuously for the intermediate scrutiny test. 19 1 Under
this test, racial quotas would have to serve important governmental
objectives and be substantially related to the achievement of these
objectives.192 This test has much merit because it recognizes that the
purpose of the equal protection clause after the Civil War was to pro-
tect blacks and to ensure them treatment equal to that accorded
whites.193 Furthermore, the framers of the fourteenth amendment in-
stituted race-conscious educational and employment programs during
the Reconstruction Era.' 94 This indicates that they did not believe that
remedial race-conscious programs necessarily violated equal protec-
tion. The irony in employing the strict scrutiny standard to review
affirmative action plans is that it often denies a remedy to the very class
of people Congress intended the fourteenth amendment to protect.
Although it provides for searching judicial review, the intermediate
scrutiny test is more appropriate because it leaves the government
190. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAIv. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972).
191. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1861.
192. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359. This test is now used in the analysis of gender classifi-
cations. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
193. 438 U.S. at 396-97 (separate opinion of Marshall, J.). Marshall stated that the
fourteenth amendment was not intended to prohibit race-conscious remedial measures
aimed at blacks. Id. He observed that the Congress that passed the fourteenth amend-
ment is the same Congress that passed the 1886 Freedman's Bureau Act, an Act which
provided many of its benefits only to blacks. Id. at 397.
194. See Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985). Schnapper advocated adoption of the inter-
mediate review standard because it is most consistent with the fourteenth amendment's
legislative history. Id. at 795. Schnapper wrote that the history suggests that limita-
tions on affirmative action plans should concern the type of benefit conferred by the
program, and not the amount of burden on whites or the precision with which black
victims of past discrimination can be identified. Id. at 796. The framers approved race-
conscious programs designed to help blacks improve their situations and to become self-
supporting. Id. Education and jobs were the two major areas of concern to the framers
of the fourteenth amendment. They are the concerns of affirmative action plans we
have today as well. Id. at 796-97.
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some room to devise an effective affirmative action plan. For example,
the intermediate scrutiny test would take into account that a race-
based layoff plan may be needed to achieve a particular hiring goal.
Assuming the hiring goal served an important state interest, a court
would find the layoff plan to be substantially related to achieving that
important interest because it protected the hiring goal. This would be
a more sound result than the Court's decision in Wygant.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court clearly indicated in its recent decision that it
supports race-conscious affirmative action under both Title VII and
equal protection in a limited number of circumstances. In Sheet Metal
Workers the Court took an important step by limiting Stotts to its facts
and by declaring that Title VII does not limit race-conscious relief to
the actual victims of discrimination. The Court's guidance in the area
of equal protection was less bold, however, and the Court still needs to
define a constitutional standard of scrutiny. This Recent Development
suggests the adoption of an intermediate standard of scrutiny in affirm-
ative action cases.
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